Intra-household efficiency is tested by using experimental data from variants of a public good game from 240 couples in rural Uganda. Spouses frequently do not maximise surplus from cooperation and realise a greater surplus when women are in charge of allocating the common pool. Women contribute less than men. These results cast doubts on many models of household decision making including unitary and collective models and on Sen's (1990) conjecture of greater female identification with household interests. We also find strong evidence for opportunism, where spouses don't contribute to the common pool even when they are in control of its allocation. Experimental results are correlated with some socio-economic conditions in a manner suggesting that assortative matching improves household efficiency. The development of non-cooperative intra-household models that allow in their empirical implementation for sensitivity to the context-specificity of gender relations seems to be a promising direction for future research.
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Introduction
The scope for and gains from cooperation and the implications for poverty reduction are the subject of an extensive literature addressing collective action problems in rural communities in developing countries (Baland and Platteau, 1996 , Ostrom, 1990 , Ostrom et al., 1994 . Much less is known about the extent and determinants of cooperative success or failure at the household level. While some non-experimental studies suggest that spousal frictions along with other factors may not only prevent efficiency gains from being realised but may also impose significant economic burdens on poor households (e.g. Jones 1983; Udry 1996), theories of the household vary in predicting whether efficiency should be expected or not, and rarely link this aspect of household performance to spousal attributes. 1 Along with spousal attributes, another important reason that cooperative gains may not be realised is the presence of asymmetric information between spouses, which is well-documented and widespread altering the size of initial endowments and control over allocation (distribution) of the common pool. We find cooperative performance to be better in variants with unequal endowments and when wives are responsible for allocating common pool proceeds. A stark inter-village contrast in the realization of cooperative surplus is uncovered.
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Contrary to received wisdom (e.g. Sen 1990 ), women do not invest more in the household public good than men. At the same time, opportunistic behaviour is common. Clues about the spousal and household attributes that are correlated with cooperative performance are gained from econometric analysis of survey data from the participating couples.
At the end of the paper we spell out the implications of our results for household theories, which are briefly reviewed here. Formal models of household behaviour have been classified under the rubrics unitary, Pareto-efficient or cooperative and non-cooperative models (Alderman et al. 1995 , Haddad et al. 1997 ).
In the unitary approach (Samuelson 1956 , Becker 1991 , the household is treated as a single agent with a unified set of preferences: all income is pooled and the identity of the income recipient does not affect household behaviour. In Becker (1991) , unequal initial endowments are a prerequisite for the latter to prevail. A key feature of cooperative models (Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981) is the assumption that the household maximand possesses the Pareto property, usually within a context of bilateral bargaining where leverage depends on individual 'threatpoints'. 3 Meanwhile, in non-cooperative models (Ulph 1988 , Woolley 1988 None of these existing experiments provide quantitative tests of household efficiency, the magnitude, determinants and locational variation in efficiency losses or income pooling coupled with an incentive compatible experimental design. Our design, which is laid out in the next section, overcomes these important shortfalls.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 elaborates on our experimental design. While Section 3 reports on the research sites and experimental implementation, Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 discusses the implications of the results.
Design
The vehicle for our hypothesis tests is a variant of a two-person game with payoff is E i -x i + z i . If the total value of the pool is y it will equal (1.5*(x 1 + x 2 )) which in turn equals the sum of payouts from the common pool, z 1 + z 2 .
The nine possible variants are summarised in Table 1 these are dictator games that were omitted from the final design because of the lack of interaction between partners and our desire to examine issues of trust. The numbers listed in the other cells label the variants used in the experiment. Two cells contain two numbers because these variants were conducted in both study sites.
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)
In all the games, the private endowment E i was known only to individual i.
The common account and the final allocation from that account was common knowledge. In the (4,000: 0) games, both partners were told that one of them received nothing, and the other some amount between zero and 4,000 Ugandan shillings.
Meanwhile, in the (2,000: 2,000) games both partners were told that they received some, potentially different amounts between 100 and 4,000 shillings.
We Theoretically, a total surplus maximizer has no incentive to withhold contributions, even in the presence of asymmetric information. Other types of players may wish to hide some or all of their endowment from their partner. In the experiment, they could achieve this by not investing in the common pool, but because there may be other motives for not investing which would apply even if endowments were common knowledge, we cannot simply interpret all failures to invest as attempted deception. For instance, a selfish player in variants 1, 4 or 7 (with 50:50 split) may not invest any sum because the net private return to a common pool investment would be negative.
The most incisive evidence of attempts to deceive is therefore provided in variants where a potential investor also controls the division of the common pool. In this context we measure opportunism as the difference E i -x i in games where player i has E i > 0 and is the allocator. In variants 3, 5, 8 and 9, we test the null hypothesis of zero opportunism.
In addition to the data from the games, information on basic socio-economic characteristics of the spouses -like occupation, education, age, parental characteristics -was collected by administering post-game questionnaires. This 7 additional information presents a chance to scrutinize the correlates of cooperative success and failure in more depth and to study relevant links between contributions and characteristics of individual spouses (and couples).
The next section provides a short description of the study sites and the implementation of the experiments. Most residents of Sironko and Bufumbo are Bagisu, a group known for intense conflict over access to resources, and gender ideals of male provider roles which are increasingly difficult for men to live up to (Heald, 1998) . Gender relations are expressed formally in terms of absolute male control, but in reality women have considerable freedom to marry whom they choose, divorce and remarry readily when marriage is unsatisfactory, and generally exercise the power that comes from men's dependence on marriage for managing their reputations, and achievement of an important dimension of adult masculinity.
Context
The marital histories of 51 couples interviewed in some depth in the weeks after the experiments show that the great majority of divorces are initiated by wives.
Also, very few men said they had thought about divorcing their current spouses, while 74 percent of women said they had, and whilst 23 percent of women reckoned they could be better off unmarried, only 4 percent of men entertained similar thoughts.
Marital failure has very dramatic consequences for men, and may be fatal, since bachelors and divorced men are socially ridiculed, suspected of sorcery and theft, and ultimately sanctioned with violence (Heald 1998 ).
Implementation of the experiments
The experiments in Sironko took place on consecutive days with experiments Collusion within a single game was avoided by a threat of exclusion (which proved to be highly effective); collusion between games on the same day was avoided by keeping waiting groups apart in a school (Sironko) or separately on the grass (Bufumbo). Collusion across days (relevant for Sironko only) was mitigated by playing the unequal-endowment games on the first day and the equal-endowment games the next day.
The main empirical results are reported in the next section.
Results
This section presents the main results that come from two types of analysis.
First, bivariate tests examine the experimental results. These tests are followed by multivariate analysis which conditions the results on experimental behaviour on spousal socio-economic attributes extracted from the post-game questionnaires. The results reported here focus on the contribution behaviour of spouses rather than allocation behaviour, since the latter can be reversed at no pecuniary loss once the experiment is over. By contrast, efficiency losses to the household resulting from contribution behaviour cannot be recovered after the experiment. Table 3 and Figure 1 give an overview of the results from the 240 couples (49 from Bufumbo, 191 from Sironko). In the table, the columns under contribution rate (x/E) give the mean fraction of endowments invested by women and men. Mean 11 y/max y is the fraction of the total available surplus which is generated by the household with the accompanying sample standard deviation in the adjoining column.
The final column reports a t-test for the null hypothesis that households maximize total surplus (total = 1). This null hypothesis is decisively rejected in all variants.
(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE)
(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE) Figure 1 shows the distribution of total (i.e. male plus female) contributions, measured as a fraction of the potential total for the nine different variants. Reinforcing the message of Table 3 , there are compelling contrasts between the variants, but in a narrow majority of observations the total surplus is not realised. However, in all variants except 8 and 9 (the Bufumbo variants) the modal surplus is 1, and in variants 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 the median surplus is 1. Overall, in Sironko a clear majority of couples (56.5%) maximize total surplus, but in Bufumbo no couple realises more than 90% of the total surplus.
Using a two-sided, unequal variances t-test we examine the null hypothesis that location makes no difference to the surplus generated, by comparing outcomes in games 8 and 9 with 3 and 5 respectively. In both comparisons the null hypothesis is rejected with p-values of 0.0050 and 0.0004 respectively. In short, the realisation of cooperative potential and thus the size of efficiency losses in the two locations are very different. Thus, there is a startling contrast in the cooperative success of couples in two villages that are not only geographically close but are also similar in many other respects.
Finding 2: A fixed sharing rule does not alter contribution levels
We test in two ways whether control of the allocation of the common pool makes a difference to contribution levels. First we compare variants with a 50:50 split to ones where one partner controls the allocation. There are four comparisons of this kind (see Table 4 ) and the tests are two-sided since there are arguments on both sides about how control (decision-making power) might impact on contributions. In this table 'Mean y/max y' is the fraction of the total available surplus realised in the game.
Results for the test are given in the final column of the table. Generally the null is not rejected.
(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE)
Finding 3: When women control allocation both male and female contributions are higher
Secondly, we compare levels of contribution in the variants where the man controls the allocation of the common pool to levels of contribution in variants where the woman makes the allocation decision (see the second part of Table 4 ). Again the test is two-sided. The null is rejected at the 5% level in Sironko and rejected at the 10% level in Bufumbo. In both sites, total surplus is higher when women control the allocation (games 5 and 9).
Total contribution is the sum of the contributions by the two partners, so we dig deeper by analysing the impact of control on individual contributions. Table 5 summarises the comparisons, which involve variants in which both partners received endowments. The column headed 'Mean x' shows mean contribution levels, x, by gender for the relevant variants. The adjacent column shows the t statistic for a two tailed independent samples test that the mean values of x are the same in each variant in the pair of variants being compared.
For each comparison, wives control the allocation for the second variant listed and in each case female control leads to higher contribution by both sexes. In short, both men and women invest more when women are in charge of the allocation. In one case (women in Bufumbo) the difference between games is significant at the 1% level. In two other cases it is significant at the 10% level with a two sided test.
(TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE)
Finding 4: There is no evidence that women contribute more to the common pool than men
For the variants in which the sharing rule is fixed, so that contributions cannot be interpreted as being influenced by expectations of the spouse's generosity, we find no statistically significant differences in contribution levels (Table 6 ).
( 
Finding 5: The null of no opportunism is rejected
We can also use Table 5 respectively for total, male and female contribution rates).
(TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE)
The variation in contribution rates by games was discussed above and the dummy variables in the regressions support those conclusions. As the univariate analysis indicated, total as well as male and female contribution rates are lower in Bufumbo than in Sironko, captured by the negative and significant coefficients on the Bufumbo dummy variable. Generally, the individual occupations of spouses do not appear to significantly correlate with contribution rates with the exception of female teachers (and males with own businesses for male contributions). Both for total and female contribution rates, coefficients indicate that households where wives are teachers have higher contribution rates. There is also evidence that husbands with own businesses contribute more. Even though generally, keeping the above exceptions in mind, the occupation of individual spouses does not seem to be significantly correlated to contribution rates, spouses with the same occupation tend to contribute more; the coefficients on 'same occupation' are all significant and positive.
These results suggest that rather than individual occupations, what matters for cooperation is whether spouses have the same occupation, in turn suggesting that assortative matching affects cooperative success.
The next set of variables capture the education of spouses. Generally, education is not correlated with contribution rates. Similar to occupation, the coefficients on same education are positive and significant in two cases (for total and male contributions). This further reinforces the suggestion that assortative matching improves household efficiency.
While age is not generally linked to contribution rates, male contributions fall (but only at 10% significance) with the age of the wife. Similarly, while the number of children is not generally linked to male contribution rates, it is weakly and 16 negatively correlated with female contributions.
We next examine correlates of opportunism, spouses hiding resources from each other even when they control allocation. The amounts set aside by the allocator spouse in the relevant games are regressed on the socio-economic variables used above. These results are reported in Table 8 .
(TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE)
It is interesting to observe that the variables that matter for male and female opportunism often are different. Both male and female opportunism are higher in Bufumbo (for female opportunism the coefficient becomes significant at only 10%).
Even though total contribution rates tend to rise in households where the female spouse is a teacher, wives who are teachers hide more of their endowments than others. In contrast, male opportunism is significantly lower if the husband is a 
Implications of the results
We have sought to illustrate that experimental games add value to the intrahousehold literature by complementing the information available from survey data with information on actual choices. To sum up our results: although surplus maximization is the most common outcome in the experiment, the majority of partners do not contribute their full endowment to the common pool. The behaviour of this majority would not be accurately predicted by unitary models, and underlines the importance of making explicit the assumption of cooperative models that Pareto efficiency in outcomes requires (among others) enforceable contracts, which in turn may be hindered by asymmetric information. Findings that no formal household model we are aware explicitly predicts are that female control leads to greater contribution rates for both sexes, and that spouses do not contribute everything to the common pool even when they are in charge of its allocation, which we term "opportunism". Moreoever, the patterns of contribution rates reported in Finding 4 do not support Sen's (1990) conjecture that women identify more closely than men with household interests, which would lead them to contribute more to the common pool than men do. Strikingly, even in cases where females are in control of allocation they contribute less than their husbands.
The significant differences between the two study villages of Sironko and Bufumbo are instructive. These are villages located near to each other with many shared socio-economic and cultural characteristics, as well as some different ones, most notably in terms of cropping patterns, with implications for the gender division of labour (more sex segregated in Bufumbo). Whereas in Sironko a clear majority of couples maximise total surplus, in Bufumbo no couple does so. Such a stark difference in household behaviour when contextual variation is relatively small sharply undermines the case for universally applicable economic models, and calls for more sensitivity to context-specificity, and thus for ethnographically informed economic models of the household.
More generally, our results call for an understanding that intra-household allocation behaviour is heterogeneous: cooperative gains are often not realised, but less often so in one village than in another, when women are in charge, and as far as male contributions are concerned, with no suggestion that these patterns would prevail in settings not studied here. That this heterogeneity is to some extent predictable is suggested by the statistical significance in the multivariate analysis of a number of socio-economic conditions, most notably spousal similarity, which points to the possible influence of assortative matching. Intra-household allocation models that allow for non-enforceable contracts and other sources of non-cooperation, as well as for the context-specificity of gender relations, would seem to be most suitable for capturing the nature of the heterogeneity that we obtained experimentally. Godfrey (1988) and Moffat and Peters (2001) , the p-values reported and critical values used for this test are for a 2-sided test even though the test itself is one-sided. This is because the null is on the boundary of the possible parameter distribution (i.e., efficiency cannot be greater than 1). 
